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LIMITATIONS IMPOSED BY THE CONSTITUTION OF
THE UNITED STATES ON THE TAXING POWERS
OF THE STATES.'
I. Impairing the Obligation of Contracts.-The provision
prohibiting the states from passing "any law impairing the
obligation of contracts," is found in the same paragraph with
the prohibition against passing any bills of attainder, ex post
facto laws, and laws granting titles of nobility: Const. U. S.,
art. 1, § 10, par. 1. The questions affecting the taxing power
of the states, arising under this provision, relate almost exclusively
to the charters of corporations which contain clauses exempting
them from taxation, anid the effect of subsequent laws repealing
these clauses and imposing taxes upon them. Whether the charter
of a private corporation, or of a corporation not municipal, is a
contract within the meaning of the Constitution, was first settled
by the Supreme Court of the United States in the celebratedDartmouth College Case : Trustees of Dartmouth College v. WoodI From a forthcoming treatise on Taxation, by Hon. W. H. BURROUGHS, of
Norfoik, Va. It may be proper to state that some specific restrictions on taxation,
such as Import nnd Tonnage Duties, Regulation of Commerce, &c., are discussed
in a separate chapter -ED. A. L. R.
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ward, 4 Wheat. 519 (Cond U. S. 463), February 1819. The court
had previously decided that a grant of lands by the legislature
of a state was a contract; that the acts of a subsequent legislature could not divest rights acquired under the grant, and a
repeal by such legislature was void : Fletcher v. Peck, 6 Cranch
164 (Cond. U. S. 328), February 1810. And shortly after they
applied the principle to a case of exemption from taxation. The
legislature of New Jersey, in order to acquire title to an extensive
tract of land held by the Indians, in consideration of a release of
that title, agreed to purchase for them certain lands, which should
not thereafter be subject to any tax. Subsequently these lands
so purchased for the Indians were sold by them under a law passed
for that purpose. The legislature then repealed that section of
the act exempting the lands from taxation. The court held the
first act a contract between the Indians and the state, and that
the vendees of the Indians could not be divested of the right
granted to the Indians, to be exempt as to this land from taxation
without impairing the obligation of the contract: .New Jersey v.
Wilson, 7 Cranch 164 (Cond. U. S. 498), February 1812. The
doctrine of the Dartmouth College Case has been followed from
that time, not only in the courts of the United States, but in all
the state courts. Recently, the correctness of that decision has
been seriously questioned, and it would seem to be clear from the
history of the adoption of this provision of the Constitution, that it
was only intended to apply to contracts between private individuals,
to give the same protection to civil contracts against retrospective
legislation as is given in the same paragraph to retrospective legislation as to crimes ; that the provision against ex post facto laws
and laws impairing the obligation of contracts, each refer to individual citizens of the states, and not to the states. This decision
has been so long and universally acquiesced in that it comes within
the principle of stare decisis, and will no doubt be adhered to even
by those courts that are convinced that it is erroneous.
(a) Alienation of the Taxing Power.-The application of the
principle of the Dartmouth College Case in connection with the
taxing power of the state, while it has received the assent of the
majority of the judges in the Supreme Court of the United States,
has been resisted most vigorously by the dissenting judges, and in
many of the state courts it has been entirely repudiated. These
cases hold that a charter of incorporation is a contract between the
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state and the incorporators, and that if these charters contain a
clause either exempting them entirely from taxation or for a definite period, a subsequent legislature cannot repeal those clauses of
exemption ; an attempt to do so impairs the obligation of the contract contained in the charter and is void ; that a state legislature may make a contract with corporations as to the revenue of
the state, and that such a contract is equally within the protection
of the Federal Constitution, as contracts with reference to property: State Bank of Ohio v. Knoop, 16 How. 869 (Cond. U. S.
190) ; Home of the Friendless v. .Rowse, 8 Wall. 430 ; Washington University v. Rowse, Id. 439; Washington Railroadv. Reid, 13
Id. 264; Hfumphrey v. .Peques, 16 Id.,244; Jefferson Branch
Bank v. Skelly, I Black 486, involving the construction of the
same statute of Ohio as in 16 How. supra; M4cGee v. _1athias, 4
Wall. 143. Many of the state courts have followed these decisions;
others have steadily opposed them. The interests involved in this
question are so great, the power of wealthy corporations who claim
the benefit of this principle is so extensive, and the tendency of
eminent legal critics to question the soundness of the views of the
majority of the Supreme Court of the United States so plain
(8 American Law Review 189; Sedgwick's Const. & Stat. Law, 2d
ed. 587, n.), that it is appropriate to give, in some detail, the views of
the dissenting judges and the dissenting state courts.
"(b) -DissentingViews.-Those who dissent generally admit the
doctrine that a state is bound by its contracts, and a legislature of
a state, as to all matters within the purview of legislative power,
may make contracts which are protected by this provision of the
Federal Constitution. But it is claimed that the power of taxation
is one of the sovereign powers of the state, necessary to its continued existence, and that 'it was never contemplated, when the
people through their constitutions delegated to their representatives in the legislature assembled the power to make laws for the
good of the people of the state, that this grant of legislative power
carried with it the right to barter away with private corporations
one of the essential prerogatives of the government, the very lifeblood of the state: State Bank of Ohio v. Knoop, 16 How. 406
(Cond. U. S. 219), the able dissenting opinion of CAMPBELL, J.
This case was really the first authoritative decision on this subject;
the case of New Jersey v. Wilson did-not discuss the important
principle that taxation was one of the powers of sovereignty that

628

LIMITATIONS IMPOSED BY TIlE CONSTITUTION

could not be alienated: 7 Cranch 164 (Cond. U. S. 49S). The
case from Ohio was decided at the December Term 1853 ; of the
nine judges on the bench, three, CATRON, DANIEL, and CA.MPIBELL,
dissented, and TANEY, C. J., while concurring in the judlgment
rendered, did not assent to the principles or reasoning contained in
the opinion of the court as delivered by MlcLEAN, J.: 16
How. 393 (Cond. U. S. 207). At the same term of the
court a case was decided friom the same state, in which the
court held that the legislation of the state did not amount to a
contract, and in that case Judge T.tNxxY gave his views upon the
principle under discussion thus : " The powers of sovereignty confided to the legislative body of a state are undoubtedly a trust
committed to them to be executed to the best of their judgment for
the public good; anl no one legislature can, by its own act, disarm its successors of any of the piowers or rights of sovereignty confided by the people to the legislative body, unless they are
authorized to do so by the constitutionunder irhihthey are elected.
They cannot, therefore, by contract deprive a future legislature of
the power of imposing any tax it may deem necessary for the
public service ; or of exercising any other act of sovereignty confided to the legislative body, unless the power to make such a
contract is eonferred upon them by the constitution of the state.
And in every controversy on this subject, the question must
depend on the constitution of the state, and the extent of power
thereby conferred on the legislative body." lie then examines the
constitution of Ohio, and arrives at the conclusion that under the
constitution of 1802, and the decisions of the courts of that state,
such power was given to the legislature of Ohio : Ohio Lfe Insurance & Thist Co. v. Debolt, 16 How. 431 (Cond. U. S. 234).
In the first case Judge TANEY refers to his opinion in the latter
case for the reasons of his concurrence in the opinion of the majority of the court. Judge GItIERi concurred entirely in these views of
Judge TANi:Y.
Firoi this examination of the views of Judge
TAXEY, it is evident that lie did not yield his assent to the proposition that a general grant of legislative power authorized one
legislature to alien the power of taxation so as to bind a subsequent legislature. Ile only claimed that the people, in their
sovereign capacity, speaking through their organic law, could delegate to the legislature such power. The subject was before the
court in 1861, the case involving the construction of the same
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statute of Ohio just considered, and the ruling was the same. At
the Deccmher Term 1869, it was again under consideration, the
majority adhering to the ruling in 16 IIoward, Judges MiLL.:it -an(
FIELD and C.J. CHASE dissenting. MINLLER, J., says, - We do
not believe that any legislative body, sitting under a state constitution of the usual character, has a right to sell, to give, or to
bargain away for ever the taxing power of the state. This is a
power which, in modern political societies, is absolutely necessary
to the continued existence of every such society: While under
such forms of government, the ancient chiefs or heads of the government might carry it on by revenues owned by them personally,
and by the exaction of personal servicefrom their subjects; no
civilized government has ever existed that did not depend upon
taxation in some form for the continuance of that existence. To
hold, then, that any one of the annual legislatures can, by contract, deprive the state for ever of the power of taxation, is to hold
that they can destroy the government they are appointed to serve,
and that their action in that regard is strictly lawful. The result
of such a principle, under the growing tendency to special and
partial legislation, would be to exempt the rich from taxation, and
cast all the burden of the support of government, and the payment
of its debts, on those who are too poor or too honest to purchase
such immunity." 1Vashington University v. .Rowse, 8 Wall. 443-4.
At the December Term 1871, the subject was again before the
court, and the question was treated as res adjudicata: Wilmingtont
Railroad v. Reid, 13 Wall. 264. And so again at the December
Term 1872, it was treated in the same manner: Humphreys v.
Peques, 16 Wall. 244. This examination shows that tie principle
claimed to be decided, and which has governed the later cases, has
really never received the assent of this tribunal. In .Aew Jersey
v. Milson it was not even discussed; in State Bank of Ohio v.
Knoop, three of the nine judges dissented entirely from the opinion
of the court, and two others, TAN.EY and GRIER (a host within
themselves), dissented from the reasoning of the court, and based
their opinions of concurrence in the result of the opinion, upon a
different principle, and fully agreed with the dissenting judges as
to the principle that a general grant of legislative power did not
authorize one legislature to alien the taxing power so as to bind
subsequent legislatures. In their opinion such a power might be
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granted by the constitution of the state and was granted by the
constitution of Ohio.
(e) Dissenting Views of State Courts.-A number of cases
werc decided at the January Term 1853 of the Supreme Court of
Ohio, arising upon the 60th section of the Banking Act of 1852,
in which the view is taken and argued with great force, that a
charter of incorporation is not a contract. The view of Burke as
to the charter of the East India Company, that it was a " clarter
to establish monopoly and create power," and not entitled to the
protection of the various elarters of English liberty, is approved;
and the charters of incorporation granted by the state, were thought
in a similar manner not to be entitled to the protection of the provision of the Constitution prohibiting the impairing the obligation
of contracts : itnoulp v. The Piqua Bank, 1 Ohio N. S. 603;
Toledo Bank v. BIond, Id. 697 ; Debolt v. Ohio Life ins. j
Trust (o., Id. 5633. These cases were reversed by the Supreme
Court of the United States in 16 How. The question was before
the Supreme Court of Ohio in ,S'undusky 1ank v. Wilbor, 7 Ohio
N. S. 481, when they adhered to their former opinion, claiming
that, although precedent was against them, the cases did not convince their judgment and ought not to be followed. The courts
of Maryland, Michigan, New Jersey, New Hampshire, Vermont,
Pennsylvania, Connecticut, and North Carolina have taken similar
views to the courts of Ohio : Mayor of Baltimore v. Balt. &3Ohio
Itailroad Co., 8 Gill 289 ; East Saginaw 1Ianif. Co. v. City of East
lSfqinaw, 19 Mich. 259 ; 8tate ex rel. ,.e. v. .Jfafqor of Jersey City,
31 N. J. L. (2 Vroom) 575 ; Brewster v. lough, 10 N. 1I. 143;
Thorpe v. R. . 3B. Rairoad Co., 27 Vt. 140; .3fott v. Penna.
aiboa1 Co., 0 Penn. St. 9; Brainardv. Colehester, 31 Conm. 410;
laleigh Railroad Co. v. Reid, 64 N. C. 155. BEASLEY, C. J., in
commenting on the proposition that a charter of incorporation is a
contract, says " the entire contract on time part of the state, implied
ill such cases, is the supposed legislative agreement not to alter or
recall the privilege granted. No other stipulation on the part of
the state was ever suggested to exist, and it was the imagined existence of such stipulation alone which converted what else, in all
its essential qualities, as well as in its form, was an act of legislation, into a contract on the part of the community with the corPorators. Without some such stipulation, having an obligatory
force, I am wholly unable to conceive the ground of difference
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between the charter of a corporation and any other act of legislation. If a statute lay no obligation on the state to do, or to refrain
from doing, a particular thing, or one or more particular things,
such enactment seems to me to be a pure act of legislation and
in no sense a contract:" 81 N. J. L. (2 Vroom) 580. And
COOLEY, J., in reviewing the cases in the Supreme Court of the
United States, from .New Jersey v. Wilson, 7 Cranch, to _McGee
v. 14tathias, 4 Wall., says, " It is not very clear that the Supreme
Court of the United States has ever, at any tim'e, expressly declared the right of a state to grant away the sovereign power of
taxation :" 19 Mich. 282, s. P. 1'on City Bank v. Pitsburgh,
37 Penn. St. 804. The court in Pennsylvania say, "Revenue is
essential to government as food to individuals; to sell itis to commit suicide :" 80 Penn. St. 9.
(d) Limitations on the Doetriie, that exemption from taxation
in a charter is a Contract.-The courts which adhere to the doctrine have guarded it with many limitations. While, as a general
rule, in the interpretation of a charter, the question is, what was
the intention of the legislature, when applied to exemptions from
taxation, it is said the intention must appear by clear, express
and unequivocal words. The relinquishment of the power of taxation will never be presumed. Those who claim that it has been
relinquished as to certain property or franchises, must show it by
express grant, in explicit terms, not by implication, or doubtful
intendment: Phila.jf- Wilmingyton Railroad Co. v. ,1arjland, 10
How. 393 (Cond. U. S.427); Jefferson Branch Bank v. Slkelly,
1 Black 447-8 ; Gilman v. Shebo1 gan, 2 Id. 513 ; Pacific Railroad
Co. v. Cass Co., 53 'No. 17; .5orth _1o. Railroadet al. v. _Jlaguire,
49 Mo. 490; Biscoe v. Coulter, IS Ark. 428. This rule of construction is universally received, and is applied so freely as sometimes almost to do away with the original doctrine. Where a
bank was chartered and its charter was silent as to taxation, the
power of the state to impose a tax on the bank after that time was
sustained: Providence Bank v. Billings, 4 Pet. 514 (Cond. U.
S. 171). A railroad was chartered to run through Pennsylvania
and other states ; it was to pay a bonus to the state of $10,000
annually, and the stock of the company, equal to the cost of construction, to be-subject to taxation as other property of the kind
in the state. Subsequently a general tax was laid by the state on
all transportation companies. It was held the railroad was not
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exempt from the general tax : Erie Railroad Co. v. Commonwealth,
66 Penn. St. 84; s. P. Bank of Easton v. Commonwealth, 10
Penn. St. (10 Barr) 442; Wanderer v.'Lexinqton, 15 B. Monroe
258. In the first case, SIIARSWOOD, J., said: "It is not pretended that there is any express release of legislative power, but it
is contended that, as the company have agreed to pay, and the state
to accept, there seems, it is necessarily implied, that no more shall
be exacted. So it might well be argued if any special taxation was
imposed upon this company ; for that would be to require an additional price beyond the terms of the contract. But the question,
whether they shall be subject to a general tax upon all railroad and
transportation companies in the Commonwealth, is an entirely differeat one." The principle is often illustrated by that of a person who
buys land from the Commonwealth at a fixed price ; it is implied
that he shall not be called on to -pay more, but not that his land
shall not be subject to taxation. So of the corporation, it is implied
that the bonus paid for the franchise shall not be increased; but there
is no implication that the property of the artificial person created
by the charter shall not be subject to taxation as other property
of the same kind in the state. But where the legislature have
exercised the taxing power in a specified manner by a special tax
on all the property of a corporation, and have intimated no design
to subject it to further burdens, its property will be exempt from
taxes imposed by general laws : . 17. & Erie Railroad Co. v.
Sabin, 26 Penn. St. 242.
A charter of a corporation contained a guaranty against repeal
and alteration, but no grant against immunity from taxation. It
claimed to be exeml)t from taxation, because it was not subject to
taxation at the date of its charter, and a subsequent tax law was
an alteration of their charter. It was held liable: St. Louis v.
B3oatmen's Ins.
Trust Co., 47 Mo. 155, the court using this
language : " law which seeks to deprive the legislature of the
power to tax iust be so clear, explicit and determinate, that there
can be neither doubt nor controversy about its terms or the consideration which renders it binding. Every presumption will be
made against its surrender, as the power was committed by the
people to the government to be exercised and not to be alienated."
The charter of a bank provides that its capital stock or profits
shall not be taxed by any municipal corporation, without authority
first had friom the legislature; afterwards the legislature authorized
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the town of Chester, in which bank was, to tax "all stocks of
every kind." Bank was not liable to be taxed by the town ; statute
must be so construed as not to tax twice: Bank of Chester v.
Ghester, 10 Richard. (Law) 104.
The legislature of Missouri declared that upon payment of certain fees, to go to the Insurance Department, by the insurance
companies, the payment should be in lieu of all taxes, fees and
licenses whatever, collected for the benefit of the state, but remain
subject to existing laws, as to county and mubicipal purposes.
The Life Association of America owned property worth $294,000;
it had paid fees under this law amounting to $150. The company
claimed to be exempt from any further tax to the state, and it was
attempted to be brought within the principle of Illinois Central
Railroad v. HeLean County, 17 Ill. 29, 30 Id. 140, where sums
of money were paid and burdens assumed in lieu of all other taxes.
But the court thought the claim was rather in the nature of an
exemption, similar to City of Zanesville v. Richards, 5 Ohio 589,
than a commutation. The intention to exempt the company not
being clear, it was held liable for state taxes on its property: Life
Association of America v. Board of Assessors of St. Louis Co.,
49 Mo. 520 ; as to surrender of taxing power not presumed, see
also Bank of St. Louis v. 2J1antfacturers'Savings Bank, 49 Mo.
575. WAGNER, J. "It is incredible that the legislature intended
that taxes on hundreds of thousands of dollars, which may come
into the hands of wealthy corporations, should be commuted for
the yearly payment of $150 or $200 in official fees."
(e) No consideration for -Exemption, it may be repealed.-It
would seem proper, if the charter of incorporation is a contract,
that the principles that apply to other contracts should apply to
that. And should it appear that there was no consideration for
the contract, it would be binding only during the pleasure of the
parties to the contract. Accordingly we find that when the legislature of Pennsylvania, in 18-33, enacted " that the real property,
including ground-rents, now belonging and payable to Christ
Church Hospital, in the city of Philadelphia,"so long as the same
shall continue to belong to the said hospital, shall be and remain
free from taxes," and in 1851 they enacted that all property belonging to corporations or associations should be taxed as other
property, and repealed all laws exempting such property, it was
held the repeal was valid; the first act was nbt a contract, it was a
VOL. XXIV.-8O
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spontaneous concession of the legislature, and no service or duty
or other remunerative condition was imposed on the corporation.
It is a privilege that from the nature of it exists bene 1)lacitum and
may be revoked at the pleasure of the sovereign : rector of (Jrist
Church, Phila., v. Coun t y qf Phila., 24 ]ow. 300, CAMPBELL, J.;
Commonvealth v. Bird, 12 Mass. 442 ; Alexander v. IVellington,
2 Russ. & My. 35 ; People v. Com'r of Taxes, 47 N. Y. 503-4.
Subsequent cases in the. Supreme Court of the United States
would seem to have overruled these authorities ; the reasoning of
the court certainly is in conflict with former cases. The legislature of Missouri, for the purpose of establishing a charitable insti-

tution, and enabling the pa'rties engaged in it more fully and
effectually to accomplish their laudable purpose, c'artered the
Home of the Friendless, and exempted its property from taxation.
Subsequently a tax was impoed on its property. The tax was
held void ; the exemption in the charter was a contract: Home of
8 Wall. 430. The same principle was
the Friendless v. lase,
applied to a literary institution, chartered a few days after : 1ashWe are not disposed to
inyton Unive'silg v. Rowse, 8 Wall. 439.
question the authority of these cases; it may be that the benefit to
accrue to the state, in having the unfortunate cared for by the corporation in the first case, and the benefit in the increased advantages of eduae'tion secured to the people of the state, in the second
case, are ample considerations to induce the legislature to grant to
the corporators who should invest their money in the enterprise, a
charter with the privilege of having its property exempt from taxation, and this privilege would be one of the franchises of the corporation. And in this sense, the language of DAVIS, J., in the

first case, " that there is no necessity of looking for the consideration for a legislative contract outside the objects for which the
corporation was created" (8Wall. 437), is correct. But, as to his
language in a subsequent part of the same opinion, that it has been
-settled by repeated adjudications of that court that the legislature
can grailt away the power of taxation, " and that it is equally well
settled that the exemption is presumed to be on sufficient consideration, and binds the state if the charter containing it is
accepted" (8 Wall. 438), it is submitted is not only not supported
by the authorities quoted by hiii, but was not required by the case
under consideration, and is mere obiter dieta.
In ,Yew Jersey v. Wilson, 7 Cranch 164 (Cond. U. S.498), the
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consideration of an exemption was the cession of the Indian title
to a valuable tract of land; the exemption was but a part of the
purchase price of land ceded to the state. Gordon v. Appeal
Tax Court, 3 Howard 133, was a bank charter, and the bonus
paid the state was the consideration for granting a charter
containing exemption from taxation. The cases in 16 How. and
18 How. (Pitua Bank v. Knoop, 16 How. 869; Ohio Life &
Trust Co., Id. 416; Dodge v. Woolsey, 18 Id. 331 ; .AeIhanica' &
Traders' Bank v. Thomas, Id. 884; Same v. Debolt, Id. 380),
were all cases under the Banking Act of Ohio, where a special
tax was agreed to be paid by the corporators for their charter,
which contained an exemption from all further taxation. Mcee
v. Mathias, 4 Wall. 143, was a case where the state owned lands
subject to overflow, and in order to promote the drainage and sale
of the lands, passed a law exempting them from taxation for ten
years, and issued scrip receivable in payment for their lands; the
exemption here was a part of the purchase price. No case has
come under our observation where there was no consideration for
the exemption, and it was made in the discretion of the legislature
as a part of the policy of the state, deemed proper at the time as
to the matter under consideration,.that it has been held, the exemption was not repealable at the pleasure of the legislature. Where
the legislature of Ohio in 1804 vested certain lands, set apart by
Congress for a university in Ohio, in a corporation created for the
purpose, authorized the lands to be rented out for the benefit of the
university, and exempted their part from the payment of state taxes;
in 1826, the corporation was authorized to sell 'the lands; these
lands were held not to be exempt in the bands of purchasers:
Armstrong v. The Treasurerof Athens Co., 16 Peters 281 (Cond.
TJ. S. 299). The evident difference between this case and New
Jesse1 v. Wilson, is that there was a consideration for the exemption in the latter case and none in the former. The cases just
considered, with the exception of the last, are the cases relied upon
by DAVIS, J., to sustain his dicta.
There are several cases in Connecticut, arising upon the Act of
1702, "That all such lands, tenements and hereditaments and
other estates, that either formerly have been or hereafter shall be
given and granted either by the General Assembly of this colony
or by any town, village or particular person, for the maintenance
of the ministry of the gospel in any part of this colony, &e., shall
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also be exempted out of the general lists of estates and free from
the payment of rates." This statute was re-enacted in 1821, leav
ing out the exemption clause. Lands had been given religious
societies under the first act, and they had been leased to third
parties, for a gross sum for 999 years, the benefit of the exemption was claimed by the lessees, the court held that the Act of
1702 was a contract between the state and the donors of the charity,
which could not be repealed: Atwater v. Moodbridge, 6 Conn.
223; Osborne v. Jlumphrey, 7 Id. 885; Landen v. Litclfield,
11 Id. 251. In the latter case, the court was divided. In 1859
the legislature of this state passed a law in reference to these
charitable donations, providing that when the society to whom
they are given or may hereafter be gi ,cn do not receive an annual
income or rent from the real estate donated, or where the conveyance is intended to be a,perpetual conveyance, the real estate so
donated shall not be exempt from taxation. Land was devised to
a religious society, it was leased for 999 years for a gross sum, no
annual rent reserved. It was held the lease was in violation of
Act of 1859 and void, and the case of Landen v. Litch field, as to
the unconstitutionality of Act of 1821 was disapproved: Brainerdv.
Colchester, 31 Conn. 407. A religious society leased to a clergyman for 999 years in payment of his settlements, he devised to D.
The exemption from taxation was claimed by D.
The court
reviewed all the former cases, overruled the cases in 6, 7, and 11
Conn., and approved the case in 31 Conn., holding that the Act
of 1702 did not constitute a contract between the state and the
donors or donees of such charitable gifts as are enumerated in the
statute, that the property donated should be for ever exempt, and
that the act making such property taxable was void: Loud v.
Town of Litehtfield, 86 Cont. 116. CAIPENTER, J., in his opinion asserts that in order to make such a contract binding, there
must be a consideration : Ibid. p. 126. In Missouri, the courts
hold that there must be an express contract upon a consideration
deemed to be a part of the value of the grant or charter : State v.
Dulle, 48 Mo. 282, following Lionberger v. Rouse, 43 Id., and
Jilshington University v. Rowse, 42 Id. 808; the last two are the
cases overruled in 8 Wall.
The case of Hard1 v. Waltham, 7 Pick. 108, seems to be in conflict with the view presented ; by act of the colonial legislature of
Massachusetts, all lands, tenements and revenues of Harvard Col-
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lege not exceeding in value 5001. per annum, shall be thenceforth
freed from all civil impositions, rates and taxes ; it was held the
lands acquired by the college before their income amounted to 5001.
were exempt from taxation even in the hands of a lessee. In this
case, there had been no attempt by the legislature to repeal the
exemption, but the assessors, supposing the exemption only applied
to the property while in the hands of the college itself, had listed
it for taxation. It will be seen from an examination of the case
that this exemption was secured to the college by the constitution
of the state, so that it would not have been within the power of
the legislature to repeal the act granting the exemption. The
weight of authority is undoubtedly in favor of the position, that a
clause of exemption from taxation in a charter, or otherwise, in
order to be classed as a contract where obligation cannot be impaired by its repeal or material modification, must be based upon a
consideration deemed valuable or beneficial to the state: Cooley
Const. Lim., 3d ed., p. 280, authorities in n. 3; Sedgwick Const.
& Stat. Law 587, n.
In 1854, the state of New York passed a law exempting from
taxation to the extent of $500 property of persons who served in
militia a period of seven years and had been honorably discharged.
In 1865 the law was repealed. The repeal was held valid; the"
claim of exemption is not a right of property; the law passed by
the legislature in relation to the militia of the state, granting the
exemption claimed, was made in the exercise of the powers committed to the legislature to promote the interests of the state by
such laws as seemed to them best calculated to obtain that end;
from the very nature of it, a different policy might seem proper to
a succeeding legislature, and the former law might be repealed:
People v. Roper, 35 N. Y. 629. PORTER, J.: "It is also true
that for an adequate consideration, and in the exercise of its general authority, it may invite investments in a particular description of property for the benefit of the state, by stipulating for its
exemption, in the hands of the holders, from assessment as a subject of general taxation :" People v. Roper, 35 N. Y. 633, in
which the cases in 16 Howard and 3 Howard, quoted by DAVIS, J.,
in 8 Wall. 438, are referred to.
Similar to this was a law offering to all persons and to corporations to be formed for the purpose, a bounty of ten cents for every
bushel of salt manufactured in the state from water obtained by
boring in the state, and an exemption from taxation of all pro-

